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e Easter Massacre and Legal Abstraction
e Easter Massacre and Legal Abstraction
When the largest peacetime massacre of African-
Americans in nineteenth-century America took place on
Easter Sunday, 1873, in Colfax, Louisiana, the U.S. gov-
ernment possessed the tools to prosecute the murderers.
e First Enforcement Act, passed sixty-two days aer
the ratiﬁcation of the Fieenth Amendment, prohibited
private individuals, as well as state oﬃcials, from taking
any of a series of speciﬁc actions aimed at prohibiting or
discouraging anyone qualiﬁed to vote in a state or local
election from voting or from performing any prerequi-
sites to voting. Aer all, what was the use of removing
the word “white” from state suﬀrage laws if the states
disfranchised blacks by other means or oﬀered no pro-
tection to African-Americans who sought to vote or to
assume oﬃces to which they were legally elected? And
the law clearly applied to the “ColfaxMassacre” of at least
105 black men, about 50 of whom where executed aer
surrendering to the well-organized group of about 300
armed whites, because the massacre was the direct result
of a disputed election. Aer an election in which they
had almost surely won a majority of the votes, local black
Republican candidates had aempted a peaceful occupa-
tion of the Grant Parish courthouse. eir slaughter was
not a conventional assault that a local or state govern-
ment could be expected to handle, but the climactic event
in a struggle for control of local government–Columbus
Nash, the Democratic candidate for sheriﬀ, led the white
mob.
e events in Colfax evoked national outrage. In
response, federal District Aorney James R. Beckwith
indicted and eventually convinced a southern jury to
convict three of the murderers. Although hardly equal
and exact justice, the punishment of at least a few of
the white terrorists signaled that the Grant Administra-
tion would continue to try to protect its loyal follow-
ers’ voting rights. at signal sent a bolt of fear through
the southern Democratic establishment, whose eﬀorts to
mount coups d’etat against the Republican Reconstruc-
tion state governments depended on having a free hand
tomurder and intimidate its white and especially its black
opponents and to stuﬀ ballot boxes to overcome the votes
of those who were not cowed. e trio’s upper class
lawyers, the ﬂower of the state and national Democratic
bar, contested the case in the U.S. Circuit Court. When
the two circuit court judges, including Supreme Court
Justice Joseph P. Bradley, disagreed with each other, the
case was certiﬁed to the U.S. Supreme Court as U.S. v.
Cruikshank.
Just as clearly covered by the provisions of the En-
forcement Act was the refusal of Lexington, Kentucky
tax collector James F. Robinson, Jr. to accept the poll
tax payment of the African-American William Garner,
who proﬀered his $1.50 in an aempt to qualify to vote.
Faced with a probable black majority within its city lim-
its, white Democratic oﬃcials, one month aer the ratiﬁ-
cation of the Fieenth Amendment, had goen the state
legislature to amend the city charter to increase its resi-
dency requirement andmandate the payment of a poll tax
before any person could vote in municipal elections. In
the January, 1873 election, the poll tax reportedly disfran-
chised two-thirds of black voters and preserved white
Democratic supremacy. Even those like Garner, who
could raise the money to pay their taxes, could be de-
nied the suﬀrage if oﬃcials pleased. For when Garner
appeared at the polls, election supervisors Hiram Reese
and Mathew Foushee refused to accept his vote unless
he presented a receipt showing that he had paid his poll
tax, which Collector Robinson, another Democrat, had
refused to allow Garner to do. Although Robinson’s ac-
tion apparently seemed so indirectly connected with vot-
ing that he was not charged under the Enforcement Act,
the denial of Garner’s right to vote by Reese and Foushee
clearly qualiﬁed as related to voting, for the prescient
framers of the Enforcement Act had foreseen that oﬃcial
as well as unoﬃcial, bureaucratic as well as violent, sub-
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tle as well as blatant means would be employed to deny
African-Americans an equal political voice. Even before
Reese could be tried, his lawyers demurred (objected) to
his indictment, and as in Cruikshank, two circuit court
judges divided.[1] e U.S. Supreme Court would now
have two cases with which to consider the interpretation
and constitutionality of the First Enforcement Act.
Although historians have long prominently men-
tioned these cases and there are lengthy and detailed
discussions of them in larger monographs,[2] this is the
ﬁrst book-length treatment easily accessible to students.
Goldman’s book illustrates the proposition that squint-
ing at legal cases by narrowing one’s view to the strictly
legal materials of one or a few cases inevitably produces
serious distortions.
Despite the existence of congressional hearings, an
army report, a long trial that featured 300 witnesses in
Cruikshank, and a plethora of recentwork on Reconstruc-
tion in both Louisiana and Kentucky, Robert Goldman
only brieﬂy sketches the backgrounds of each case and
tells us almost nothing about the plaintiﬀs or defendants
and not much more about the lawyers who represented
them or the federal judges who decided the cases at each
level. Nor does he examine the consequences of the cases
for the parties involved. Were Cruikshank, Reese, and
their compatriots rewarded for their labors for the party
of white supremacy with higher oﬃce? Were the blacks
who survived Colfax driven from politics? How com-
paratively eﬀective were violence and legal maneuvers
in stemming the Republican threat? Although Goldman
does not note it, the Republican ticket in Grant Parish
polled nearly as high a percentage in the 1876 presiden-
tial election as the percentage of African-Americanmales
of voting age in the parish, an indication that the epic vi-
olence was less of a ﬁnal solution than the Democrats
hoped it would be. Such stirring events, such a chance
to recover the memory of so many suﬀerers and villains,
such an opportunity to breathe life into the abstract for-
malism of the law–squandered!
It is not that the formal legal issues inReese andCruik-
shank are uninteresting. Indeed, they are as weighty as
they are complex. e bevy of legal talent representing
the Democrats, which included a former senator, two for-
mer U.S. Aorney Generals, and even ex-U.S. Supreme
Court Justice John A. Campbell, launched a similar bar-
rage of criticisms of the indictments in both cases. e
most extreme declared that the only eﬀects of the three
Reconstruction constitutional amendments were to ban
slavery and to force states to remove the word “white”
from their suﬀrage laws. In this view, the national gov-
ernment had no more power to protect any rights, in-
cluding those related to the right to vote, such as the
right not to be killed when going to the polls, than it
did before the Civil War. States could not be required
to protect their citizens, and the national government
could not intervene to protect individuals if the states
failed to do so. It is interesting to note, though Goldman
does not, that former Justice Campbell had argued an
equally extreme nationalist position, that the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments brought nearly all rights under na-
tional protection (“conscience, speech, publication, secu-
rity, freedom, and whatever else is essential to … liberty”
is the way he put it), as aorney for the Butchers’ Benev-
olent Association in the 1873 Slaughter House Cases. Next
in ideological radicalism came the view, espoused in oral
argument by David Dudley Field, the brother of siing
Supreme Court Justice Stephen J. Field (who did not re-
cuse himself in the case), that the Enforcement Act and
all other acts that Congress had so far passed pursuant to
the Reconstruction Amendments were unconstitutional,
because the Amendments granted Congress power only
to prescribe judicial remedies for any state laws that vio-
lated the Amendments, not to criminalize speciﬁc actions
by individuals or state oﬃcials. Goldman, who oﬀers few
explicit comments or critiques of the arguments for the
defendants, inexplicably characterizes Fields’s argument
as “moderate” (p. 86). ird was the contention that the
constitutional amendments applied only to explicit state
legislation, not to the actions of state oﬃcials. A fourth
position was that the Amendments constrained only the
actions of a state, not those of private parties. is might
have invalidated the provisions of the Enforcement Acts
banning private persons or oﬃcials who could claim not
to be acting in their oﬃcial capacities from interfering
with voting, but it could hardly have saved Reese, whose
refusal to accept Garner’s vote would have been mean-
ingless if he had lacked the authority to do so. e ﬁh
argument was that the only constitutional justiﬁcation of
the Enforcement Act was the Fieenth Amendment’s ban
on discrimination in voting “on account of race,” and that
the sections of the Enforcement Act that deﬁned crimes
lacked justiﬁcation under the Fieenth Amendment be-
cause they did not explicitly mention race, as other sec-
tions of the Act did. A contradictory sixth stance aacked
the words of the indictments because they failed to men-
tion race as the cause of the discrimination, words that
the law, on this reading, required.
It was this last argument, that although the Enforce-
ment Acts were constitutional, the indictments were de-
ﬁcient, because they did not allege a racial purpose for
the murders in Cruikshank, that Justice Bradley, sit-
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ting on circuit, as Supreme Court justices had to before
1891, latched onto. Disagreeing with the other judge in
the trial, U.S. Circuit (and later Supreme Court) Judge
William B. Woods, Bradley ruled that the defendants
should go free. e split vote automatically brought the
issue before the U.S. Supreme Court on a division of opin-
ion.
It was very curious for Bradley to take that posi-
tion in his June 27, 1874 opinion in Cruikshank, because
he had espoused a much more nationalistic view in his
forceful dissent to the Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision in
the Slaughter House Cases. A Louisiana case, Slaughter
House was the ﬁrst by the U.S. Supreme Court to con-
strue the Fourteenth Amendment, and it was decided, co-
incidentally, the day aer the Colfax Massacre, on April
14, 1873. In Slaughter House, the majority ruled that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not nationalize rights such
as the right to practice an occupation, unrestrained by
state laws aimed at protecting people’s health and safety.
In his dissent from that ruling, Bradley took the po-
sition that the Fourteenth Amendment did nationalize
such “privileges or immunities,” a stance that was en-
tirely consistent with the theory under which federal at-
torneys throughout the South had been interpreting the
Enforcement Act–that the irteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fieenth Amendments gave Congress the power to pro-
tect all peoples’ positive rights to assemble freely, to bear
arms, and not to be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law, rather than merely pro-
viding that the states could not deny to blacks what-
ever rights they granted to whites. e purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Bradley said in Slaughter House,
was to make American citizenship “a sure guaranty of
safety … [so that] every citizen of the United States
might stand erect in every portion of its soil, in the full
enjoyment of every right and privilege belonging to a
freeman, without fear of violence or molestation.” e
black bodies roing in the swamp in Colfax could not
hear andwould not have appreciated the delicate irony of
Bradley’s transformed words only fourteen months later
in Cruikshank. e nationalistic position, based prin-
cipally on the Fourteenth Amendment, which does not
mention race, allowed Congress and the courts consider-
ably more power, power that they clearly needed in or-
der to protect African-Americans from a diﬀerent sort of
white butchers than those involved in Slaughter House.
By contrast, under the theory that Bradley adopted in
Cruikshank, Congress’s powers to pass the Enforcement
Acts derived only from the Fieenth Amendment, which
does mention race, and prosecutors had to allege and
prove a racial intent behind every discrimination. Gold-
man (pp. 58-59) suggests that Bradley adopted the nar-
row construction of congressional powers not to follow
the previous year’s Supreme Court majority or to agree
with the Democratic lawyers’ constricted views of con-
gressional power, which le them free to overthrow Re-
construction by violence and chicanery, subject only to
the laws of the states once they controlled them, but sim-
ply to bring the issue before the Supreme Court, perhaps
without a strong view on how it should be decided.
ere are three diﬃculties with Goldman’s interpre-
tation: First, since widespread violence and electoral dis-
crimination oﬀered the Grant Administration so many
chances to indict well-connected perpetrators, it was in-
evitable that the issues would eventually come to the
Supreme Court. ere was no need for Bradley to dis-
agree with Woods to raise the issue to the highest ju-
dicial level.[3] Indeed, the Reese case had been on the
Supreme Court’s docket for ﬁve months when Bradley
issued his opinion. Second, if the New Jersey Republi-
can justice had been at all ambivalent about the legality
of Enforcement Act prosecutions, and if he had wished
to preserve the lives of at least a few black political ac-
tivists, he could have agreed with Woods’s decision and
allowed the Enforcement Acts to retain their vigor in
the extremely important circuit in which the case took
place, perhaps inhibiting some of the later terrible vio-
lence there. ird, if Bradley had been even the slight-
est bit unsure of his newfound position, he would not
have personally sent his opinion to federal district judges
throughout the South, members of the U.S. House and
Senate Judiciary Commiees, and the editors of three le-
gal periodicals.[4] Bradley’s liberal ideals were for white
businessmen alone, and more than any other ﬁgure, he
shaped the Cruikshank case. It is unfortunate that Gold-
man spends so lile time trying to explain Bradley’s mo-
tives and account for his role.
e government was represented by distinguished
counsel in the cases, including future Supreme Court jus-
tice John Marshall Harlan in the circuit court trial in
Kentucky, and one of the longest serving Solicitor Gen-
erals in American history, North Carolina Republican
Samuel F. Phillips, in the Supreme Court. Phillips, as-
sisted by Aorney General GeorgeWilliams, argued that
the Kentucky oﬃcials’ actions, taken in their oﬃcial ca-
pacities, were those of the state, and that because the Fif-
teenth Amendment did not speciﬁcally mention a par-
ticular protected race, the sections of the Enforcement
Act were clearly within the purview of the Amendment,
even though they did not make racial considerations an
explicit part of the crimes they announced. Phillips con-
tended, as well, that the right to vote was either one
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of the undeﬁned privileges and immunities of citizen-
ship according to the original constitution (a position,
though Goldman does not note it, similar to that taken on
fundamental rights by the principal framer of the Four-
teenth Amendment, John A. Bingham) or that it had be-
come such a privilege since the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although insisting on the power of the na-
tional government to protect the political rights of citi-
zens of any race, for this case, Phillips relied purely on
the Fieenth Amendment’s authorization of protection
of the right against discrimination on account of race.
e evidence produced at the trials, Phillips believed, had
demonstrated the requisite racially discriminatory intent.
In Cruikshank, Phillips further asserted that under com-
mon law, inherited by the American legal system, the En-
glish government had enjoyed extensive power to pun-
ish conspiracies, a power invoked by Section 6 of the En-
forcement Acts, under which Cruikshank and his confed-
erates were convicted. e defense’s counter-argument,
that conspiracy law had oen been used in the past to
trample civil liberties, was not only outrageous in this
case, coming as it did not from the slaughtered, but from
the poor, persecuted mass murderers, but it also contra-
dicted the defendants’ other arguments that the national
government had no business concerning itself with indi-
vidual rights, such as, in this instance, the right to form
a violent conspiracy.
e Supreme Court docketed Reese in February, 1874
and Cruikshank in October, 1874, and heard oral argu-
ments in the cases in January and March, 1875, but did
not issue opinions in them until March 27, 1876. Gold-
man neither explains why it took so long nor compares
the decision time in this with that in other cases of the
era to see how extraordinary this length of timewas then.
Aer all, the Court was nearly unanimous in both cases,
and Justice Bradley had already wrien an opinion that
tracked the ﬁnal outcome on most issues. e timing of
the decisions remains an interesting puzzle. More im-
portant, Goldman does not recount the events of the pe-
riod between the Circuit and Supreme Court decisions,
events that provided a stark background to the issues
and almost certainly aﬀected the decisions. All over the
South, Democrats, gleefully, and Republicans, fearfully,
interpreted Bradley’s opinion as a signal for the escala-
tion of racial violence of whites against blacks and po-
litical violence of Democrats against Republicans.[5] In
the guise of the “White League,” “Red Shirts,” or Ku Klux
Klan, Democrats then brought terror to a crescendo. In
Louisiana itself, a “riot” in New Orleans, one of whose
leaders, Robert H. Marr, represented Cruikshank in both
the Circuit and Supreme Courts, prepared the way for
the complete overthrow of the governments of New Or-
leans and Louisiana. In the fall of 1874, Democrats won
a shocking and decisive national victory in the congres-
sional elections, taking control of the House for the ﬁrst
time since secession and threatening to overturn every
facet of Reconstruction except perhaps the antislavery
irteenth Amendment. Outraged by the violence and
frightened by the prospect that Democrats would win
the 1876 elections, the Republican caucus in the House in
February, 1875, before the newly elected Congress could
take oﬃce, agreed on a new, far-reaching Enforcement
Act. Among other provisions, the bill gave federal elec-
tion supervisors the right to arrest people for intimidat-
ing voters, increased the penalties for election irregular-
ities, mandated federal registration of voters, prohibited
excessive poll taxes, forbade carrying guns on election
day, and greatly enhanced the powers of election su-
pervisors in rural areas. Aer overcoming Democratic
delaying tactics and blustery, racist, partisan rhetoric
that brieﬂy transﬁxed the nation, Republicans passed a
slightly weakened bill in the House on Feb. 28. e bill
failed in the Senate in the last days of the lame duck ses-
sion in early March, aer Reese had been argued and
a few weeks before the oral argument in Cruikshank.
To rule the First Enforcement Act unconstitutional in
Reese or Cruikshank was to sweep away the strongest
existing protection of African-American suﬀrage and to
abort more comprehensive protection, such as the 1875
bill, whenever the Republicans regained a majority in
both houses of Congress, not just to invite Congress to
amend the Act to cure slight ﬂaws. A decision like Jus-
tice Bradley’s, which merely threw out the indictments,
was unjust, but probably remediable. But ﬁnding the law
even a lile bit unconstitutional was fatal. It would be
eighty-two years before Congress managed to pass other
legislation to protect minority voting rights.
From 1789 to 1875, the Supreme Court had over-
turned only three laws of Congress–inMarbury v. Madi-
son, Dred Sco v. Sandford, and e Legal Tender Cases.
is record implies that the Court followed two more re-
cent conventions: if it can avoid a constitutional issue
by deciding on the basis of a statute, it does so; and if
it can equally well construe a law in ways that make it
constitutional and unconstitutional, it chooses the con-
stitutional construction. Adhering to these conventions
minimizes conﬂicts with the legislature. Ignoring them
prompts charges that the judges are seeking uncontrol-
lable power.
Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite, President Grant’s
seventh choice to replace the deceased abolitionist
Salmon P. Chase, presented his strike for judicial–and
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white–supremacy as an instance, instead, of judicial def-
erence. Although Sections 1 and 2 of the brief First
Enforcement Act mentioned race and claimed Fieenth
Amendment justiﬁcation, Sections 3 and 4 did not re-
peat such formulas, referring only to the “wrongful act or
omission as aforesaid” or using similar locutions. Writ-
ing for an 8-1 majority in Reese, Waite contended that to
interpret Sections 3 and 4 as in the context of Sections 1
and 2, instead of separately, as if no other part of the law
existed, would have eﬀected the judicial, not the legisla-
tive, will, requiring the Court “to make a new law.” Rul-
ing that the Fieenth Amendment was the only possible
justiﬁcation of the law, and ﬁnding that Sections 3 and
4 did not mention race, Waite threw out these sections
as beyond the constitutional power of Congress and dis-
missed the indictments based on them. e Chief Justice
never examined the congressional debates or any other
materials besides the text of the law in reaching the con-
clusion that the two sections of the law had nothing to
do with the provisions that immediately preceded them.
Neither does Goldman.
at Waite forced the constitutional issue, instead
of avoiding it and allowing later prosecutions for in-
terfering with political rights, is underlined by the re-
actionary Justice Nathan Cliﬀord’s concurring opinion,
which had originally been scheduled to be the opinion of
the Court.[6] Cliﬀord doubted that William Garner was
properly qualiﬁed to vote, either because of Cliﬀord’s
racist view that the black Garner could not have raised
$1.50 to pay his poll tax (as Goldman believes), or because
poll tax payment and depositing a ballot were separate
acts under the control of diﬀerent oﬃcials. It followed for
Cliﬀord that Reese and Foushee had not illegally disfran-
chised Garner, and the justice therefore did not need to
reach the question of constitutionality. His opinion could
have been circumvented by draing indictments and pre-
senting evidence more carefully to include tax collectors
and show their connection to voting. Waite’s view was
thus more racially retrogressive than that of the last an-
tebellum appointee still siing on the Supreme Bench in
1875.
Waite’s opinion in Cruikshank expanded on that in
Reese, dispatching the constitutional bases for national
protections with as lile concern as the Louisiana thugs
had shown in ﬁnishing oﬀ their black prisoners. In
what might be viewed as the essential part of his opin-
ion, Waite echoed Justice Bradley’s opinion on circuit,
holding that the indictments were deﬁcient because they
did not allege that the victims had been targeted be-
cause of their race. But the Chief Justice did not stop
there. Instead, he adopted virtually the whole states’
rights program of the most extreme defendants and com-
mented not just on the Fieenth Amendment issues, to
which Phillips andWilliams had primarily conﬁned their
brief, but to explicating the whole Reconstruction con-
stitutional selement. According to the Chief Justice,
the Fourteenth and Fieenth Amendments created no
national rights except the right not to be discriminated
against because of race, which had to be shown explic-
itly. For the protection of virtually all other rights, such
as the rights to assemble peacefully and to bear arms, or
to take any action related to voting in a state or local elec-
tion, citizens had to look to the states alone. is posi-
tion, so contradictory not only to the view of the four
dissenters in Slaughter House, three of whom remained
on the Court in 1875, but also inconsistent with the ex-
pansive tone with which Justice Samuel Miller’s major-
ity opinion in that case had promised protection of black
rights, severely constrained all future national legisla-
tion. Violence, intimidation, ballot box stuﬃng, restric-
tive election laws, suppression of all means of exercis-
ing or enjoying political rights–none of these, at least in
connection with state and local elections, could be coun-
teracted by national legislation unless it could be proven
in court that those who perpetrated them did so on ac-
count of race. e debate over the 1875 Enforcement Act,
which only a year earlier had convulsed the Congress for
a month, was futile, for it would all have been uncon-
stitutional. us, Waite’s opinions disarmed federal pro-
tectors of voting rights just as political violence reached a
climax, enabling white Democratic supremacists to over-
throw Reconstruction governments without fear of ef-
fective prosecution. e opinions were not simply part
of the Compromise of 1877; without them, Hayes would
have won easily and there would have been no crisis and
no need for a compromise at all.
In a lone, persuasive dissent, Justice Ward Hunt
strongly criticized Waite’s interpretative severing of
parts of the Enforcement Act from each other in Reese as
violative of the intent of Congress in passing the law, as
well as of the Fieenth Amendment. Concerning himself
with legal exegesis on the narrowest part ofWaite’s opin-
ions, he eﬀectively treated the other parts as dicta, that is,
as inessential to the Court’s holding. Characteristically,
Goldman praises Hunt’s narrowness and condemns the
Solicitor General’s expansive brief for not following the
Justice’s strategy (p. 100).
Goldman’s revisionist claims, the major themes of his
book, that the Waite opinions were “narrow” and “mod-
erate,” and that they did not adopt the defendants’ ex-
treme states’ rights positions, abort future national pro-
tection of voting rights, or even declare certain sections
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of the First Enforcement Act unconstitutional (pp. 100-
06), are insupportable.[7] ey are the product not only
of what I have indicated above that I believe to be mis-
readings of the opinions themselves, but more basically,
of abstract, static, internalist legal history itself. Al-
though abstractions are important, segregating legal his-
tory into a doctrinal gheo, apart from elections, legisla-
tive policy making, and the currents of popular opinion,
distorts both the explanations for legal decisions and the
evaluation of the consequences of those decisions.
e argument, which Fairman had previously de-
veloped, that Waite’s opinions in Reese and Cruikshank
were moderate because they did not expressly foreclose
national protection of voting, is unconvincing for four
reasons. First, it is based on hindsight. In Ex Parte
Yarbrough (1884), a unanimous Supreme Court upheld
an Enforcement Act prosecution not under the Fieenth
Amendment, but under the Article I, Section 4 power of
Congress to control the “times, places, and manner” of
congressional elections, and Justice Miller implied in his
opinion that congressional power under this provision
was quite extensive. If such a novel reading of this sec-
tion of the Constitution had been imagined either at the
time of consideration of the Enforcement Acts or dur-
ing the litigation of Reese and Cruikshank, however, some
lawyer would surely have included it in a speech or brief.
Since no one did, it is anachronistic to impute it to Chief
Justice Waite or to those who interpreted his opinions
when they were issued. Waite’s statements were sweep-
ing, seeming to preclude any national protection of the
rights of voters, and it was impossible to know at the time
which of his sentiments would be considered as dicta. In-
deed, dicta in general become visible only by hindsight;
at the time an opinion is wrien, all of it seems essential,
for otherwise, it would have been omied.
Second, the argument for moderation ignores the fact
that state and local elections and oﬃce-holding could be
and oen were separated from national elections and
oﬃce-holding. Both the Colfax Massacre and the Lex-
ington poll tax issue concerned local government, and
it is diﬃcult to see how they would have been aﬀected
by a law growing out of Yarbrough, such as the Lodge
Elections Bill of 1890, which passed the House and was
shelved in the Senate by one vote.
ird, the argument disregards the timing of Reese
and Cruikshank. e circuit court opinion preceded and
the Supreme Court opinion followed the heated bat-
tle over the last really strong voting rights legislation
considered in Congress until 1965. Bradley’s opinion
in Cruikshank gave congressional Democrats constitu-
tional ammunition for the debate and hope that the Court
would disallow any resulting law. By requiring a proof
of a racially discriminatory purpose and eliminating the
states’ failure to protect rights equally as a justiﬁcation
for national intervention, Waite’s opinions made fram-
ing any law to safeguard voters exceedingly diﬃcult and
severely constrained what any such law could accom-
plish. Coming when they did, the decisions also, as I
have said before, greatly facilitated the overthrow of the
remaining Republican governments in the South.
Fourth, the First Enforcement Act was almost by def-
inition within the original intent of the framers of the
Fieenth Amendment, for it was passed in the same ses-
sion of Congress that wrote the Amendment and got it
ratiﬁed in virtually record time. Cobbled together from
several shorter bills, the Act was broad and complex, and
a few Republicans raised objections to the wording of
some of its sections. But they voted 181-1 for it in both
houses of Congress, as they had voted 183-5 in favor of
the Fieenth Amendment earlier in the session, which is
as strong an endorsement of a law’s alignment with orig-
inal intent as one could imagine. How can opinions that
disregarded such evidence and nulliﬁed the law only six
years later be regarded as “moderate”?
We cannot understand the signiﬁcance of Reese and
Cruikshank unless we set them in their whole racial, par-
tisan, and policymaking context, place them in the actual
timewhen theywere decided, and consider both their hu-
man causes and their human consequences. Since, like
most legal historians, Goldman does not complete this
task, his book leaves much to correct and much to be
done.
Notes
[1]. As Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion,
1864-1888 (New York: Macmillan, 1987), II, 251-53, points
out, it has been known since 1892 that the Supreme Court
erred in considering the whole cases of Reese and Cruik-
shank, instead of just those points of law on which the
circuit court judges disagreed. Technically, therefore, the
Supreme Court’s opinions were invalid. Goldman, who
cites Fairman’s book in his bibliography, leaves out this
curious fact.
[2]. In addition to Fairman’s very detailed chapter,
II, 225-89, there is a lengthy treatment in Robert J. Kac-
zorowski, e Politics of Judicial Interpretation: e Fed-
eral Courts, Department of Justice and Civil Rights, 1866-
1876 (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1985), 173-
227.
[3]. As Fairman, II, 269, but not Goldman, points
out, there was no general right to appeal to the Supreme
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Court in a criminal case until 1889. But a disagreement
between two circuit court judges did result in an auto-
matic appeal. e Supreme Court received its current
extensive discretionary power to choose cases in 1925.
[4]. Fairman, II, 265.
[5]. Kaczorowski, 188-93.
[6]. Waite took the opinion for himself when he con-
cluded that, in his words, it “would be decided on consti-
tutional grounds.” Goldman, p. 89.
[7]. Aer Cliﬀord initially draed his opinion, Waite
reassigned the majority opinion to himself because of his
desire “that the enforcement cases would be decided on
constitutional grounds.” oted in Fairman, II, 244.
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